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 COLLECTIVE INACTION 
AND COLLECTIVE 
EPISTEMIC AGENCY 
 Michael D. Doan 
 14.1  Responsibility for Collective Inaction: Th e  Seinfeld Paradigm 
 Why would we want to help somebody? That’s what nuns and Red Cross workers 
are for! 
 George Costanza (“The Finale”  1998 ) 
 Twenty years after it aired to an audience of 76 million, the fi nal episode of  Seinfeld still looms 
large in the popular imagination. For philosophers interested in the idea of collective responsi-
bility, it was also among the most memorable thought experiments in television history. While 
it seems unlikely that Larry David was cribbing philosophical perspectives on responsibility for 
collective inaction when he wrote the script for “The Finale,” the episode does employ a par-
ticularly infl uential insight of Virginia Held’s. According to Held, even a “random collection” of 
individuals 1 can sometimes be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not 
organizing themselves into a group capable of so doing (Held  1970 ). Considered as a thought 
experiment, “The Finale” invites us to imagine:  What would happen if Held’s insight were codifi ed 
into law? How would a judge hold us accountable for failing to join forces and act together when nothing 
less would have suffi  ced to prevent harm? 
 Here is how the thought experiment unfolds: the scene of the crime is Latham, Massachusetts 
(Jerry, the New Yorker, calls it “Sticksville”). Jerry and friends are hanging out on a street 
corner— joking around about nothing, as usual. Across the street, and in full view and hearing 
of the four, a carjacker pulls an overweight man named Howie out of his car, robs him at gun-
point, and fl ees the scene in his vehicle. Kramer stands by, fi lming the entire incident on his 
camcorder. Meanwhile, Jerry, Elaine, and George crack sarcastic, fat- shaming jokes at Howie’s 
expense. Howie, who could see that the four did nothing whatsoever to come to his aid, relays 
his plight to Matt Vogel, the reporting police offi  cer. Vogel immediately puts the four under 
arrest, citing Article 223– 7 of the Latham County Penal Code. Elaine protests, “What? No, 
no— we didn’t do anything! ” Vogel replies, “That’s exactly right. The law requires you to help or 
assist anyone in danger so long as it’s reasonable to do so.” George complains, “I’ve never heard 
of that.” Responds Vogel, “It’s new— it’s called the Good Samaritan Law” (“The Finale”  1998 ). 
 In fact, several European countries and ten U.S. states had similar laws on the books by the 
time the curtains closed on  Seinfeld in 1998. These laws tend to include criteria similar to those 
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proposed by Held, who holds that a random collection can only be held responsible for their 
inaction “when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to the reasonable person and 
when the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable” (Held  1970 : 476). According to 
what in the U.S. are called “duty to rescue” or “Good Samaritan” laws, the penalties for failing 
to come to another’s aid are typically minor. In “The Finale,” though, they are much stiff er: the 
local law calls for a maximum fi ne of $85,000 and as much as fi ve years in prison. As the epi-
sode unfolds, the defendants in the controversial “Good Samaritan Trial” (the aptly named 
“New York Four”) are ultimately found guilty of criminal indiff erence and sentenced to a year 
in prison. The upshot of the thought experiment is clear:   pace Jackie Chiles, defense lawyer 
extraordinaire, there surely  is such a thing as a “guilty bystander,” and such bystanders can and 
will be made to pay for their crimes of omission (“The Finale”  1998 ). 
 I’m struck by how frequently “The Finale” comes up in discussions of responsibility for 
collective inaction. Incidentally, most philosophers working on the topic make use of a handful 
of thought experiments that conform to what I  have come to call “the  Seinfeld paradigm.” 
In these relatively simple “coordinated bystander cases” (Isaacs  2011 : 143), a particular harm 
(say, a carjacking) cannot be prevented through the isolated, uncoordinated actions of indi-
viduals, but only through a collective action undertaken by an as of yet unformed organized 
group (say, by Jerry, Elaine, George, and Kramer joining forces to scare off  a gunman). Next 
to Held’s bystanders to a strangling case (Held  1970 ), there is Larry May’s bystanders to a 
drowning child case (May  1990 ); David Copp’s bystanders to homelessness case (Copp  1991 ); 
Torbjörn Tännsjö’s bystanders to pushing a car up a hill case (Tännsjö  2007 ); and Tracy Isaacs’ 
bystanders to a river rafting disaster case (Isaacs  2011 ), to name a few of the most memor-
able variations (see also Petersson  2008 ). These cases share the following key features: fi rst, the 
victims are always depicted as totally helpless, while the protagonists are cast as completely 
innocent “bystanders”— that is, they are not directly implicated in or aff ected by the problem 
prior to their alleged failure to intervene. Second, the problems can always be solved by a 
single collective action, even when several collective action solutions are available. Third, the 
risks of taking the required course of action are always minor, whereas success is assured. Since 
the problems have no systemic dimensions, the prospect of solving them never threatens the 
statuses, identities, or ways of life of anyone involved. Indeed, most of these cases have been 
designed to be even more clear cut than that of the New York Four, whose reluctance to con-
front a gunman is at least understandable. 
 Following Held’s lead, each of the above- mentioned philosophers makes use of similarly- 
structured thought experiments in the course of arguing that a random collection can some-
times be blamed for failing to act collectively. However, Isaacs has recently broadened the focus 
of conversation by asking: what do these accounts suggest are our  present responsibilities with 
respect to some of the most urgent and complex problems of our time, such as climate change, 
ecological degradation, and global poverty? Although there has been some disagreement about 
when it makes sense to say that a random collection could have done otherwise, and over 
how responsibility ought to be distributed when such a group has failed to act, there has also 
been considerable agreement both methodologically and substantively. Each philosopher agrees 
that we ought to employ some version of the reasonable person standard 2 when determining 
whether a group has failed to act or has an obligation to act now. And although each stops short 
of drawing out the legal implications of their views, they generally agree that blame is a mor-
ally appropriate response in many instances of collective inaction, even those involving merely 
“putative” or “loosely structured groups” (May  1990 : 270). 
 In this chapter I consider the costs of this striking convergence in methodology. I wonder: What 
questions about collective responsibility cannot be asked when the focus of inquiry is narrowed 
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to cases fi tting the  Seinfeld mold? I argue that the use of fi ctional thought experiments in philo-
sophical analyses of collectively responsibility unhelpfully constrains our thinking, precisely in 
those places where it needs to be at its most generative. While there are many possible avenues 
of criticism here, 3 I  focus on how the received way of thinking about responsibility for col-
lective inaction ignores and renders irrelevant the epistemic agency and creativity of ordinary 
people, 4 while excluding from consideration a range of problems that clearly call for coordinated 
responses, yet have no obvious, readymade solutions. What is needed, I propose, is not a diff erent, 
more nuanced set of thought experiments, but an altogether diff erent approach to thinking about 
responsibility for collective inaction. In the course of exploring a concrete case of collective 
brilliance in action, I suggest that the production of new questions, ideas, and knowledge in and 
through collective struggle ought to be at the very center of future inquiry. 5 
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds in two parts. First, I off er a critique of the received 
way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction. Second, I propose an alternative 
approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navi-
gating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in 
the context of climate change, particularly in coastal regions: so- called “natural” disasters, such 
as hurricanes and superstorms, wreaking havoc on communities— fl ooding homes, collapsing 
infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and 
livelihoods. What happens when philosophical refl ection begins  here — in places where the 
institutions and practices that have emerged over the last century seem incapable of addressing 
the problems communities face now, 6 and where people fi nd themselves turning to one another 
for the sake of their own survival? 
 14.2  Breaking Free of the  Seinfeld Paradigm 
 Why should philosophers break free of what I  have called “the  Seinfeld paradigm”? In this 
section, I  explore the pitfalls of basing our accounts of collective responsibility on analyses 
of cases fi tting the  Seinfeld mold. I begin with a brief review of Held’s infl uential account of 
responsibility for collective inaction. Next, I consider what we inevitably miss when our focus 
is narrowed to fi ctional thought experiments of this type. 
 Recall that, on Held’s account, a random collection of individuals can only be held respon-
sible for failing to act collectively “when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to 
the reasonable person and when the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable” (Held 
 1970 : 476). Writing in 1970, Held anticipates much future conversation when she remarks, in 
passing, on the possible implications of her view for “political situations”:
 If a reasonable person judges that the overthrow of an existing political system is an 
action that is obviously called for, he may perhaps consider himself morally respon-
sible for the failure of the random collection of which he is a member to perform 
this action. If he thinks some action to change an existing political system is obvi-
ously called for, but is not clear about which action, he may consider himself morally 
responsible for the failure of the random collection of which he is a member to per-
form the quite diff erent action of transforming itself into a group capable of arriving 
at decisions on such questions. 
 (480) 
 A provocative example, to be sure. Revolutionary fervor aside, though, Held seems to be making 
a bid for theoretical simplicity and parsimony here. Having based her account on an analysis of a 
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handful of relatively simple coordinated bystander cases, she seems to be suggesting that we can 
simply scale up to far more complex situations from there. Perhaps, then, we need rely on only 
a single set of tools when grappling with collective action problems of all sorts. 
 Held’s gambit has more recently been taken up by Tracy Isaacs. Whereas Held starts with 
a case involving a strangler on the subway, Isaacs draws our attention to a group of children 
rafting down a river (Isaacs  2011 : 243). Suddenly caught in rapids, hurtling helplessly toward 
a waterfall, the children will surely be killed if a random collection of onlookers does not join 
forces to intervene. Isaacs utilizes this thought experiment to argue that even a group of com-
plete strangers can  presently have a collective obligation to come to the aid of others, at least in 
situations where there is “a clear map between the situation, the required course of [collective] 
action and a collective agent” (ibid. 143). Scaling up to the question of what our current respon-
sibilities are with respect to such complex problems as climate change, Isaacs argues that the 
members of a loosely structured group are collectively responsible for coming together and 
acting when— and only when— a collective action solution has, as she puts it, “come into focus” 
(ibid. 152). Harking back to Held’s passing remarks, Isaacs suggests that the collective obligation 
to implement a given solution “exists in virtue of the clarity, by the standard of the reasonable 
person, of the collective action required” (ibid. 148). Hence, “Where there is a lack of clarity at 
the collective level, what is lacking is a clear picture of what collective course of action would 
eff ectively address the moral concern” (ibid.). 
 How often is this knowledge condition met? 7 I suspect it is met only rarely, in relation to 
a very specifi c set of problems. To see this, consider a revised version of Larry David’s thought 
experiment. I call it “The Inverted Finale” because it features a case lacking all the distinguishing 
features of the  Seinfeld paradigm. 8 My version invites us to imagine:  What would happen if Held’s 
knowledge condition were incorporated into our practices of holding ourselves and others accountable? Whose 
collective inaction would be excused and, with time, taken for granted? 
 Here is how the revised thought experiment unfolds:  Jerry and friends are hanging out 
in front of a Manhattan diner. On a daily basis, and in full view and hearing of one another, 
they have each been participating in a variety of social practices that rely on energy- intensive, 
fossil- fuel dependent cycles of extraction, production, consumption, and waste (e.g., eating 
animal products, heating and cooling their spacious apartments, commuting in cars, and more). 
Although each of the four aims to cause as little suff ering and death as possible, they know they 
are deeply implicated in situations they repudiate. Simply by living, eating, and throwing things 
away in a major U.S. city, they are caught up in broader systemic processes which they know 
are causing signifi cant, ongoing harms to ecosystems and lives both near and far, and which are 
clearly unsustainable in the long run. They are aware of the many ways they benefi t from the 
oppression of others and are also deeply damaged by the interlocking systems they play a role, 
however small, in reproducing. They understand that they, too, are being killed by those systems, 
however much more softly— that they, too, are neither the totally helpless “victims” of systemic 
outcomes, nor are they merely “standing by,” unaff ected and aff ecting none. Given their col-
lective involvement in the ecological and social problems that keep them awake at night, they 
could hardly consider themselves “inactive.” Simply by going with the fl ow, they are actively 
sustaining what they know to be unsustainable. 
 Noticing the weary expressions on his friends’ faces, Kramer captures the moment on his 
camcorder. Meanwhile, Jerry, Elaine, and George crack self- deprecating jokes, debating who 
would be the fi rst to be killed on  The Walking Dead . Newman, Jerry’s mail carrier, is every bit 
as aware as the others that his attempts at “ethical consumption” make little diff erence. He, too, 
has come to realize that there is no single, defi nitive collective action participation in which 
they could “solve” their shared predicament. Joining organized, long- term eff orts to bring about 
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systemic change would require signifi cant commitment and could also involve a measure of risk 
and sacrifi ce. Even so, Newman feels frustrated that the New York Four are telling jokes while 
the world burns— frustrated enough to share his plight with a cop walking the beat. Confused, 
the cop looks Newman square in the eye:  “What do you mean, ‘ they aren’t doing anything ’? 
Aren’t doing  what , exactly? Talk to me when you’ve got a clear solution, wise ass.” The upshot 
is clear:  pace Held, Isaacs, and others, it is highly doubtful that we can simply scale up from the 
cases on which they focus, to the far more complex situations, such as climate change and global 
poverty, that they also claim to be off ering resources for addressing. 
 Two lines of response are available here. First of all, those who remain sympathetic to the 
received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction might reject my description 
of the New York Four’s predicament. In place of “The Inverted Finale,” they might generate 
another thought experiment that makes Jerry’s relationship to climate change seem a lot more 
like his relationship to a carjacking (the victims would be elsewhere, completely powerless; 
there would be no systemic dimensions to the problem; Jerry and friends would somehow be 
standing by, innocently, with no stake in the situation; and so forth). This would show that the 
types of problems I claim fall outside of the  Seinfeld paradigm can be made to fi t— or, at least, 
that specifi c aspects of those problems can be ignored for simplicity’s sake. In that case, perhaps 
the New York Four are not off  the hook for their collective inaction after all. 
 I fi nd this response deeply unsatisfying. For one, I take it that an account of collective respon-
sibility will only be useful to the extent that it helps us deal with the full range of problems that 
call for coordinated responses. Problems superfi cially, inaccurately, or otherwise falsely described, 
cannot be collectively dealt with, so our accounts need to approach the characterization of 
situations in an empirically rigorous way. Given that my description of the New York Four’s 
predicament accurately captures some of its more salient features, and also seems applicable to 
several systemic problems other than those mentioned here, it stands to reason that situations 
of these types cannot be forced to fi t the  Seinfeld mold without considerable distortion. Unless 
it can be shown that situations with these features either do not or could not arise or are so 
rare as to be unworthy of mention, it will be diffi  cult to fi nd promise in the received approach. 
 Second, those still determined to take up Held’s gambit might simply bite the bullet. They 
could accept that there is nothing strange about the cop’s readiness to excuse the New York 
Four, insisting instead that it is Newman’s frustration that cries out for justifi cation. After all, 
there has to be a limit to the situations that a loosely structured group can be held morally 
responsible for failing to address, and it makes sense to draw the line at cases where there is no 
clear picture of what collective action would eff ectively address the concern. If the boundaries 
of collective responsibility ought to be drawn elsewhere, then a case to that eff ect needs to be 
made. Otherwise we are just trading intuitions and are unlikely to get very far. 
 This response fares no better. As I point out elsewhere (Doan  2016 ), the burden of proof 
lies with those who favor Held’s knowledge condition, for that condition expresses a sub-
stantive view about the circumstances under which we should see ourselves and others as 
sharing responsibility for working together to address impending crises and catastrophes, not to 
mention many already present disasters. Yet it is hardly self- evident and has yet to be defended. 
So, an argument is owed in defense of the above- mentioned presumptions about the bounded 
nature of collective responsibility, and about the precise location of those boundaries. 
 It may make sense to draw a boundary in the place Held proposes. But I suspect that is only 
if we have already joined her in adopting a peculiarly  juridical frame of mind. Although Held is 
concerned with questions of moral responsibility, she does invite us to consider such questions 
from the peculiar vantage of a judge or juror, reducing collective responsibility to collective 
 liability and relying on a legal fi ction for the sake of adjudication. But I doubt that we need to 
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think like a state offi  cial to hold ourselves and others accountable for what we collectively fail to 
do (see Doan  2016 ; Young  2011 ). If adopting a juridical approach means we can no longer have 
meaningful conversations about our shared responsibility for addressing seemingly intractable 
systemic problems, then that is an approach to be avoided, not embraced. 
 Furthermore, I  take it that part of the point of the practice of holding ourselves and 
others accountable for our collective inaction is to encourage each other to come together, 
get organized, and do what is required of us to reduce the amount of harm and injustice in 
the world. If we can only justifi ably hold one another accountable when a clear solution has 
 already “come into focus,” then what are we to do about those problems that have no obvious, 
readymade solutions? How are we to handle those situations where it would be fl atly unreason-
able to expect the emergence of a single collective action that is perfectly “clear” to and “clearly 
favorable” for all involved? What about those situations where the people and institutions we 
have grown accustomed to looking to for answers either have none to share, or none at all? Here 
the received view is curiously silent. 
 Whereas it may seem inconsequential to draw a line around those situations we are already 
equipped to address with considerable confi dence, the problems that make the New York Four 
weary are not so easily dismissed. Of course, the interrelated problems of climate change, eco-
logical degradation, and global poverty do not suddenly resolve themselves when the cop refuses 
to make an arrest. Under these circumstances, what relief is there in saying to one another, 
“Well, at least we’re off  the hook”? Unless we fi nd meaningful ways to hold ourselves and others 
accountable for coming together to address especially challenging problems  in spite of our shared 
not knowing how to go on , we will be left without a valuable tool for protecting what matters. 
 In summary, the received approach to thinking about responsibility for collective inaction 
excludes from consideration a range of ecological and social problems that clearly call for 
coordinated responses, yet have no obvious, readymade solutions. Defenders of this approach 
must either distort such problems in ways that preclude the development of appropriate 
solutions, just to make assignments of responsibility intelligible, or else admit that unorganized 
groups bear no responsibility whatsoever for activating themselves. Neither option is acceptable. 
 One notable consequence of sidestepping systemic problems in general— and problems that 
existing institutions and practices are incapable of solving, in particular— is that the received 
approach ignores and renders irrelevant the epistemic agency and creativity of ordinary people. 
Suppose that the only problems loosely structured groups are collectively obligated to address 
are those for which clear collective action solutions have already, somehow, “come into focus.” 
Oddly enough, we would never bear any responsibility for collectively analyzing especially 
complex, seemingly insoluble problems, even those we have a hand in creating and are harmed 
by; for cultivating each other’s capacities to imagine new strategies; or for engaging in ongoing 
processes of collective learning, experimenting with, and revising those strategies over time. 
Some of us would probably fi nd ourselves waiting around for others to dream up solutions, 
leaning on specialized institutions and authorities. Others would hope for sudden fl ashes of 
insight— fl ashes that are unlikely to ever come. Never calling upon one another to think for 
ourselves, our collective problem- solving capacities would likely atrophy from lack of use. Yet 
the problems would remain, growing worse all the while. 
 Instead of rendering the epistemic agency of ordinary people irrelevant, in the fi nal section 
of this chapter I  suggest that the production of new questions, ideas, and knowledge in and 
through collective struggle ought to be at the very center of future inquiry into collective 
responsibility. Rather than relying on thought experiments, I turn to a concrete case of people 
coming to each other’s aid, exhibiting their collective brilliance under extraordinarily trying 
circumstances. I explore this case at some length, not to pump the reader’s moral intuitions, or 
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to defend an alternate set of criteria for collective liability, but in order bring to the fore certain 
questions about collective responsibility that would otherwise go unasked. 
 14.3  Acting Together in the Midst of Disaster 
 We must never forget these facts that made Hurricane Katrina a travesty: That climate 
change is creating unprecedented storms in size and intensity. Katrina was one of them. 
That ongoing ecological destruction in the name of profi ts has been perpetuated for 
more than a hundred years, including the destruction of wetlands and other natural 
barriers along the coastlines, allowing hurricanes to move further inland than ever 
before, in order to open up access to Gulf oil and commercial shipping routes. Next, 
it was that levees were built substandard by corruption and greed when contractors 
and some politicians knew they would never hold. And, fi nally, that the government 
response at all levels left thousands of people to die who had no means to evacuate due 
to health, age, and lack of funds, transportation, or connections. Individuals and fam-
ilies were trapped in their homes, on the streets, on their rooftops, and in their attics. 
Power reacted with brute force and criminalization of the people. It was criminal neg-
lect. This was the latest in a long history of largely invisible disasters of neglect in these 
communities. To me, the levees became a symbol of the way that the corruption and 
arrogance of governments disregards the most vulnerable people. 
 (crow  2014 : 4) 
 When Hurricane Katrina devastated communities across the Gulf Coast in the summer of 
2005, it became painfully clear to many people living in the U.S. that climate change was no 
longer some abstract or distant problem. As the above remarks from long- time community 
organizer scott crow suggest, the impacts of climate change 9 are shaped by a variety of factors— 
psychological, social, and systemic— including inadequate preparation, corruption, arrogance, 
greed, and deeply ingrained patterns of indiff erence and neglect. When the levees surrounding 
New Orleans gave way to surging coastal waters, all the amenities upon which residents had 
come to rely abruptly vanished. Many houses were swept away or consumed by fl oodwaters, 
while others were left smoldering in fl ames amidst sparking power lines and leaky gas mains. 
Water, electrical, and telecommunications infrastructures were downed or disconnected. 
Flooded cars, busses, and streets rendered the usual modes of transportation unusable. Jobs were 
swiftly relocated, rendered irrelevant, or disappeared. Meanwhile, opportunistic landlords raised 
rents amidst growing real estate speculation. Developers and investors scooped up bundles of 
properties for a song, often holding buildings left vacant and in disrepair, banking on rising 
values to come. Charter schools swooped in to replace an underfunded public school system left 
further in disarray, saddled with dozens of crumbling buildings: rooves leaking, mold spreading, 
immersed in a toxic soup of fl oodwaters laced with gas, debris, and animal carcasses. 
 While thousands of New Orleanians were voluntarily evacuated by government agencies 
in the days following the storm, many others were forcefully displaced to disparate locations 
hundreds of miles away, often without any means of returning home. The several thousand 
others whom the federal government simply left behind to fend for themselves, or who were 
unable or refused to be evacuated from their homes, were faced with the enormous challenge 
of surviving in post- Katrina New Orleans. The diffi  cult situations of many remaining residents 
were exacerbated by the fact that offi  cial channels of support proved grossly incapable of 
addressing emerging needs, particularly in historically underserviced neighborhoods. In several 
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overwhelmingly poor, largely black communities, state- sponsored and professional relief was 
either entirely absent, or unhelpfully, insultingly present, answering to needs that didn’t exist and 
setting up bureaucratic hurdles that prevented people from accessing needed services. 
 In his 2014 book,  Black Flags and Windmills , crow off ers an extensive account of why so 
many people were compelled to rush  into New Orleans with “emergency hearts” (65), pre-
cisely when the federal government was struggling to evacuate everyone they could manage. 
In his own case, it was a longstanding friendship with Robert H. King, a former member of 
the Black Panther Party, that fi rst moved crow to journey from his home in Austin, Texas. King, 
who was living in New Orleans when Katrina made landfall, lost contact with crow when the 
levees broke. With the streets fl ooding and news of a citywide lockdown spreading, crow grew 
increasingly worried. When an acquaintance proposed that the two go in search of King, crow 
“had to know if he was all right” (ibid. 8). “As a community organizer who cares about people 
no matter where they might be,” recalls crow, “I felt that it was my responsibility to aid those in 
New Orleans who, already marginalized, now had total devastation added to their burden” (8– 
9). After making an initial, particularly jarring trip into the city by boat, the search team turned 
up no signs of their friend, returning to Austin deeply shaken by all they had encountered along 
the way. 
 Several days later, upon receiving a call for aid from Malik Rahim, crow decided to make a 
second trip to New Orleans. Taking another opportunity to search for King, he also intended 
to contribute to relief eff orts organized by those with deep roots in the city. Rahim, a veteran 
community organizer and former Panther, had helped run free breakfast for children in two 
of the most poverty- stricken housing projects in New Orleans. Calling from his house in the 
predominantly black neighborhood of Algiers, Rahim reported to crow: “we got racist white 
vigilantes driving around in pickup trucks terrorizing black people on the street. It’s very ser-
ious. We need supplies and support” (ibid. 46). 
 By the time crow arrived, Rahim and his neighbors, including native New Orleanian Sharon 
Johnson, had already been struggling to fi nd ways to provide basic aid to one another. “There 
was no Red Cross, no FEMA,” writes crow. “There were no other options” (ibid. 50). On 
September 5, 2005, the trio decided to form a collective based at Rahim’s home in Algiers, 
calling themselves the “Common Ground Collective” in honor of their lost friend King. 10 
Within a week, the group grew to around fi fty strong. Over the following months, its ranks 
swelled to several hundred, with mostly white, twenty- something, anarchist- oriented volunteers 
arriving from across the country. Common Ground was a community- initiated, all- volunteer 
organization with a mission “to provide short- term relief for victims of hurricane disasters in 
the Gulf Coast region, and long- term support in rebuilding the communities aff ected in the 
New Orleans area” (ibid. 229). Much of the group’s work involved responding to seemingly 
intractable problems confronting those left behind, many of which were shaped, in part, by inept 
government and philanthropic responses. As crow recalls,
 We were seeing, in real time, what slowly fi ltered out to become painfully apparent 
worldwide. The state was off  balance and unresponsive. The entities within it were 
failing to grasp the developing issues. The Red Cross wasn’t doing any better. They 
were raising  billions of dollars while people were still suff ering. For me, it was the 
closest thing to seeing those in Power lose their stranglehold of control. We interpreted 
this as an opportunity to create an autonomous space where residents could establish 
self- determination over their future, be treated with dignity and respect, and have 
access to basic services that hadn’t existed in years, if ever. We would begin relief work, 
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without reliance on or interference from the state or professional aid agencies. We 
would prefi gure the civil society we would like to see in the future. 
 (ibid. 65) 
 I want to propose that an alternative approach to understanding collective responsibility can be 
assembled from the work of Common Ground— one that draws our attention to the collective 
accomplishments of ordinary people navigating impossibly diffi  cult situations. 11 This approach 
can be summarized in three recommendations for future inquiry, to which I now turn. 
 14.3.1  Clear Paths or Paths Cleared? 
 Characterizing Common Ground as a “revolutionary aid organization,” crow recounts their 
fi rst three years in Algiers as “a story of ordinary people compelled to act for justice in an extra-
ordinary situation” (ibid. 59, 4). Indeed, the collective’s story is one of people joining forces to 
deal with problems that existing institutions and practices were not— and likely could not— 
address, thus exhibiting their collective brilliance in action. As a guide to understanding col-
lective responsibility, crow’s retelling of the story teaches us to focus not on what other people 
ought to have known at a given instant, but on  how those who came to each other’s aid managed to 
generate new questions, ideas, and knowledge together, in and through collective struggle . 
 For instance, next to Algiers in the much smaller, wealthier, whiter neighborhood of Algiers 
Point, a racist white militia had surfaced in the wake of the storm. Militia members hung hos-
tile, stigmatizing signs (e.g., “You Loot, We Shoot”) outside their homes and patrolled the streets 
of neighboring black communities in trucks, harassing and on several occasions, gunning down 
unarmed black men with impunity (Thompson  2008 ). “It was as if the dam of civil society that 
kept them from acting out their most racist tendencies had broken enough to allow their hatred 
to emerge,” writes crow.
 Local authorities, with their racist attitudes toward the communities they were 
supposed to protect, stood by and let this militia function. There were bullet- riddled 
bodies of black men in the street, including the one that we tried to get picked up for 
days while it continued to decompose. 
 (crow  2014 : 51) 
 How would the collective and their neighbors protect themselves? Who would check these 
racist vigilantes, and how— with local law enforcement in complete disarray, at best, and pas-
sively or actively supporting racist terrorism, at worst? “In the stress of those days, I struggled to 
think through the unstable situation,” writes crow (ibid. 59). Under circumstances unfamiliar to 
all involved, there was no dearth of clear solutions to the threat of racist violence left unpoliced. 
Nevertheless, drawing lessons from the community safety programs initiated by the Panthers 
in the late 1960s (see Newton  2009 ), and retailoring those experiments to suit a historically 
unique situation, members of Common Ground came up with the idea of setting up safety 
patrols, taking up a practice of community armed self- defense— a practice that crow notes 
was adopted reluctantly and as a last resort, following a series of violent confrontations (crow 
 2014 : 55– 58; cf. crow  2018 ). According to crow, “The presence of whites and blacks working 
together against the militia would later be cited by locals as one of the factors that helped ease 
tensions in that diffi  cult time” (crow  2014 : 54). “Self- defense opens up the possibility of chan-
ging the rules of engagement,” he observes in retrospect. “It doesn’t always make situations less 
violent, but it can help to balance the inequity of power” (ibid. 58). 
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 Taking up arms to discourage racist violence also helped remaining residents direct their 
collective energies to addressing the scarcity of basic amenities. After establishing a measure 
of security for themselves and their neighbors, on September 13 the collective came up with 
the idea of setting up a distribution center at Rahim’s home. The plan was to gather supplies 
on regular out- of- town excursions while coordinating larger deliveries from abroad. Within 
a matter of weeks, Common Ground was able to make a wide variety of goods and services 
available to Algiers residents, operating the distribution center “from 7 a.m. until curfew, seven 
days a week” (ibid. 115). With the help of a team of street medics, the group also established a 
more permanent fi rst aid station in a nearby mosque, which quickly evolved into the Common 
Ground Health Clinic. This clinic— one of three the collective would eventually set up— still 
operates to this day, having morphed into a non- profi t organization by the same name. 
 Common Ground went on to give birth to a wide range of programs organically, out of 
necessity, attending keenly to evolving local problems and needs with an optimistic, creative 
outlook on the future. As crow puts it, “Our intentions were to create permanent and sus-
tainable solutions with and for those who were the most aff ected,” grounded in the practice 
of solidarity and, eventually, “mutual aid” (ibid. 103, 165). For example, in addition to pro-
viding protection from white militias and distributing basic amenities, members also fought for 
displaced residents’ rights to return; provided legal aid and safe shelter for women; pressured 
police for accountability and supported prisoners’ rights; prevented housing demolitions, partly 
by gutting and repairing structures; used available legal means and direct action tactics to halt 
evictions; worked together with neighborhood councils; and helped create long- term food 
security through small- scale agricultural projects (ibid. 165, Appendix). The collective included 
a team of street medics and, eventually, nurses and doctors. In addition to establishing clinics, 
members engaged in Latinx health care outreach; cleaned up garbage and toxic fl oodwaters 
along streets and in houses; provided soil and water testing; off ered bioremediation services for 
soils damaged by toxic substances; made counselling and social work services available, as well as 
massage, acupuncture, and herbal remedies; constructed compost toilets for families dealing with 
plumbing problems and water shutoff s; and planted community gardens that brought people 
together growing food. 
 Unlike state and professional aid organizations, Common Ground refused to see those whom 
they were serving as faceless or helpless victims, insisting instead on treating their neighbors 
as “active participants in the struggle to make their lives better”— that is, as  people who were 
coming together “to struggle for survival, justice, and self- determination” (ibid. 103, 60). Rather 
than establishing relations of dependence between long- time residents, on the one hand, and 
relief organizations staff ed by out- of- towners, on the other, the collective worked to support 
those most directly aff ected by the storm in taking charge of their own lives; in collectively 
analyzing deeply rooted problems in the course of developing solutions; and in rebuilding their 
own communities in sustainable, self- determining ways. While it would not be unreasonable to 
suppose that organizations such as FEMA and the Red Cross ought to be best positioned to 
deliver aid, the types of solutions that seemed clearest to these groups were actually among the 
problems Algiers residents would be forced to confront. 
 14.3.2  Inactive Groups or Groups in Action? 
 The array of ideas and experiments Common Ground managed to generate in the midst of 
severe instability, uncertainty, and hostility is truly astounding. So is the amount of collective 
learning that took place over those years, which later nourished a variety of developing projects, 
including the Occupy Sandy relief eff orts that surfaced in 2012 (see Lustig  2012 ; Moore & 
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Russell  2011 ). Second, then, I want to suggest that the story of Common Ground teaches us to 
focus not on particular, supposedly singularly signifi cant moments of collective inaction, but on 
 how such moments of astounding collective creativity emerge in the fi rst place . 
 As the philosopher John P. Clark points out in his foreword to the second edition of  Black 
Flags and Windmills , collective responses to overwhelmingly complex problems do not just 
materialize out of thin air, even when they seem like genuine miracles. They certainly are not 
the result of sudden fl ashes of insight, nor of clear blueprints for collective action studiously 
absorbed by groups of strangers. Rather, “such miracles have deep roots” (crow  2014 : xviii). 
The moment of Common Ground’s emergence was “the product of many small but powerful 
transformative moments,” adds Clark ( 2014 : xix), not only in the personal lives of its founders, 
but in the lives and afterlives of the broader social movements from which the collective drew 
inspiration, volunteers, and material support, and to whom its members continually looked for 
hard- won lessons. 
 Some of those histories of collective struggle helped shape the place and people of New 
Orleans, including many who became involved in Common Ground. Other layers were national 
and global in scope— particularly in the cases of the Spanish anarchists during the 1930s, the 
Black Panthers during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Zapatista Army for National Liberation 
(EZLN) from the 1980s onward, whose work was especially infl uential in the formation of 
Common Ground. “In each of these political tendencies, people rose up to create initiatives that 
addressed complex and interrelated problems,” observes crow. “
 They didn’t follow prescribed blueprints for revolution; they reimagined and 
reconfi gured them. When they made mistakes, they learned more about them-
selves and the evolving situations around them, so as to be more eff ective. They were 
motivated by the love of humanity that drives us to create something better in the face 
of cynicism and repression. 
 (2014: 72) 
 14.3.3  Conditions for Collective Blame or Brilliance? 
 Finally, the story of Common Ground teaches us to focus not on the conditions for collective 
liability and blame, but on  how to create the conditions for more such moments of collective brilliance in 
the lives of more people . 12 These moments are clearly valuable, protecting people from impending 
harms while building towards more liveable futures. Moreover, we know that these moments 
have underlying conditions— not only in the initial hours and days when people fi nd them-
selves thrown into states of emergency, but in the ongoing practices of mutual care and nurtur-
ance cultivated in their everyday lives, long before and after storms of various sorts. 
 I fi nd crow’s notion of the “emergency heart” useful in describing what motivates people 
to take up the responsibility we all share for making more such moments possible. Inspired by 
the words of Geronimo ji Jaga, the notion of the emergency heart encapsulates a deep feeling 
of love that “forms parts of the roots from which struggles grow” (ibid. 87). “Love drives what 
I call our  emergency hearts to action and change in the face of repression and against all odds,” 
writes crow. “The emergency heart is the feeling of empathy and compassion that motivates us 
to act now to end oppression and destruction. An emergency heart gets people into the streets 
to resist injustice and create something better” (ibid.). 
 Much as collective responses to overwhelmingly complex problems may seem to materialize 
out of thin air, the emergency heart may seem to beat for exceptional situations only, moving 
people to act in the now  of disaster , in the midst of chaos and uncertainty. But there is another, 
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more mundane sense in which the “state of emergency” is what arises between human beings 
whenever we fi nd one another in assembly and set to work on assembling ourselves collect-
ively. This everyday sense of emergency is, as Clark points out, “the normal condition of human 
beings in constant need of responsiveness to other human beings” ( 2014 : xvii). Part of that 
shared need is a need to prepare each other to respond in situations where no clear and defi ni-
tive responses are in the offi  ng, and where no single portion of prior knowledge and skill will 
suffi  ce. There are no sure- fi re techniques for readying one another here, though there are plenty 
of past lessons from which to learn, and the story of Common Ground is but one worthwhile 
resource. Neither will there be any single, decisive moment where we collectively fail at the 
task of mutual preparation. As crow’s retelling makes plain, it will take a good deal of patience 
and encouragement to sustain each other for the long haul— the creative patience of love in the 
midst of emergency. 
 14.4  Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective 
inaction is unhelpfully constraining. Not only does it exclude from consideration a range of 
systemic problems and crises that clearly call for coordinated responses, but in so doing, it 
ignores and renders irrelevant the epistemic agency and creativity of ordinary people. Perhaps 
these consequences would seem at least somewhat acceptable if the institutions and practices 
that have arisen over the past century were somehow capable of addressing each and every 
problem communities now face, and also equipped us to foresee and get out ahead of all pos-
sible complications down the line. As creatures in and of history, though, we should expect 
the emergence of new, more challenging situations in the wake of each solution proposed and 
implemented by fallible beings such as ourselves. Challenges such as these tend to encourage us 
to question those ways forward that have come to seem “clear” and “clearly favorable,” to listen 
anew to and think diff erently with one another, and to rely on the collective resourcefulness 
and creativity of people in motion. 
 While exploring the work of Common Ground in post- Katrina New Orleans, I proposed 
an alternative approach to thinking about collective responsibility, expressed in summary 
form as three recommendations for future inquiry. When considering concrete cases of 
people acting together in response to seemingly intractable problems, I recommended that 
philosophers focus on how those who come to each other’s aid manage to generate new 
questions, ideas, and knowledge together, in and through collective struggle; on how these 
moments of collective creativity emerge in the fi rst place; and on how to create the conditions 
for more such moments in the lives of more people. The upshot of my proposal is that philo-
sophical analyses of collective responsibility need to do justice to the existence of systemic 
problems, many of which cannot be solved by way of a single collective act, utilizing the epi-
stemic resources and skills already at our disposal. Stories like that of Common Ground help 
us move beyond the limitations of the received view, which reduces collective responsibility 
to collective liability and, in so doing, narrows our focus to single, allegedly decisive moments 
of inaction, single- mindedly concerned with attributions of blame. Given that there are not 
always such singularly signifi cant moments, particularly in the case of challenges both unfore-
seen and unforeseeable, it seems more important to start coming to grips with and acting 
upon our shared responsibility to develop each other’s capacities for mutual responsiveness, 
preparation, and coordination in ongoing ways. As crow’s words and work suggest, there is 
no special “now” when the emergency heart moves people into motion to create something 
better. 
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 Whether and when we ought to hold ourselves and others accountable for our collective 
failure to take up this responsibility is no simple matter, particularly where stories of collective 
struggle are not well known or well studied. Perhaps by shifting our approach to thinking about 
collective responsibility, though, we might better enable one another to seize upon more oppor-
tunities for exhibiting collective brilliance in our everyday lives. 
 Notes 
  1  As Held explains, a “random collection” of individuals is a type of group distinguished by the fact that 
it has no decision- making procedure in place, and its members do not display much, if any, solidarity 
(Held  1970 : 471). 
  2  The  reasonable person standard is a legal fi ction used to determine liability in criminal and tort cases. 
The term refers to a hypothetical person whose conduct exhibits average care, skill, and judgment. 
Thus, this person’s conduct serves as a standard against which an actual person’s conduct may appear 
negligent. 
  3  In an earlier paper (Doan  2016 ), I off er a critique of the epistemological assumptions undergirding this 
shared approach to thinking about collective inaction. 
  4  I understand  epistemic agency in terms similar to Kristie Dotson, who focuses on “the ability to utilize 
persuasively shared epistemic resources within a given community of knowers in order to participate 
in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources” (Dotson  2014 : 115). 
  5  I owe this formulation to Robin D. G. Kelley. As he points out, “Social movements generate new 
knowledge, new theories, new questions. The most radical ideas often grow out of concrete intellectual 
engagement with the problems of aggrieved populations confronting systems of oppression” (Kelley 
 2002 : 8). With Kelley, I use the term  collective struggle to refer to the collective eff orts of aggrieved 
populations confronting systems of oppression and forcefully freeing themselves from systemic 
constraints. 
  6  I owe this formulation to Shea Howell. 
  7  I call it the  knowledge condition because it implicitly references the cognitive states of the members of a 
random collection (Doan  2016 : 6). 
  8  I draw inspiration here from Alexis Shotwell’s thoughtful discussion of “constitutive impurity” 
(Shotwell  2016 ). 
  9  I understand  climate change impacts in terms similar to Kyle Powys Whyte, who describes such eff ects as 
“arising based on the capacity of patterns of community relations to absorb local ecological alterations 
stemming from climate change,” which may be more or less disruptive insofar as they can be absorbed 
by existing structures of organization without those structures needing to change (Whyte  2014 : 601). 
 10  While giving a speech, King had once said: “If we as people are going to exploit anything it should 
be our  commonness ” (crow  2014 : 96). King was eventually found, alongside his dog, Kenya. He told his 
friends: “I knew y’all would come” (ibid.). 
 11  I focus on the story of Common Ground not because the group’s work is beyond criticism, but because 
it provides an illustrative example of people creating new cultural and economic practices together, 
through thousands upon thousands of collective acts. 
 12  While blame may sometimes be appropriate, its helpfulness in addressing the underlying problems is 
easily overstated. Partly for this reason, my work attends more to political than moral responsibility 
(Doan  2016 ). 
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